incomplete portrait of a complex figure
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Like many sources, this book praises wingate without enough
careful examination of his flaws. The book focuses mostly
on three chapters in Wingate's life. It starts with his
service in palestine in 1936.
Driven by religious fanaticism and his contempt for what
he saw as uncivilized peoples (arabs or any non-europeans
really), he attached himself to Zionism and zionist politicians.
In the process he exceeded or ignored his orders, then after
politically compromised himself in open alliance with zionist
groups to a point where he could not possibly serve there.
His great "vision" for the region was for a "sub-empire"
with Zionists serving as a sort of spartan military elite
to subdue and westernize those considered lesser humans. All
as part of some sort of twisted fanatical vision of christianity.
After having been booted out of Palestine, he eventually ended
up in Ethiopia where he again ignored his orders. His goal
this time was to force a royal government on Ethiopia regardless
of what anyone else thought and in spite of serious reservations
on the part of politicians and his superiors. His campaign
was a wonderful "boys adventure" sort of a affair, but in the
end it was army won the campaign. Wingate's great accomplishment
was saddling Ethiopia with an unstable and territorially
aggressive monarchy that eventually collapsed in a bloodbath
in the 1970s.
After, he went into open revolt against the entire leadership
of the army in the area. He openly insulted them and held them
in utter contempt. In his mind, though he had never held
a position of high responsiblity in the army, he saw himself
as being some sort of grand illustrious figure. And when
his campaign of alination, insults and personal attacks failed
to get him recognition, he attempted suicide. Contrary to the
book, his megolmania and self-destructive behavior would indicate
someone with serious problems rather than a great leader.
He was rescued from career oblivion by a friend in India. He
was sent into Burma in 1942 to see what could be done in the
way of irregular warfare. For all his bluster, he did nothing.
And beyond that, while other men were suffering and dying
on the march back to India, Wingate arranged to be flown out.
Back in India, he was given a brigade to test out his theories
with. He whined about what he was given in terms of men. He
only wanted british soldiers. He threw the men into jungle
camps during the monsoon with the idea that by inflicting the
maximum amount of suffering and disease, that british men
who had his opinion been weakened by access to health care
and doctors in britain would be made strong again. When the
casualty rate reached over 50%, he moved the men into regular
housing and they recovered. The book presents the self-serving
fiction that the casulaty rate declined due to weeding out
"bad men" when in reality it only improved because the monsoon
ended and the worst of the camps was abandoned.
Wingate's first mission into Burma served no real purpose. It
was originally to be part of a broader plan, but when the
broader plan was cancelled, wingate demanded that the operation
go ahead anyway as a training exercise. He led the men into
Burma, put a railway out of operation for a few weeks and
then led his men deep into Burma where they accomplished nothing.
Eventually, Wingate executed one of his brilliant strategies
to solve the situation. He broke up his command and effectively
gave the order every man for himself. The force or more
properly what survived of the force returned in small parties
to India.
Once back, Wingate ignored his men in favor of launching a
press and publicity campaign on his achivements. He wrote
a self-serving account of operations and when his commanders
raised objects to it, he arranged for a copy to be given
directly to Churchill and the cabinet. Wingate decided to
bypass the entire army and come under the patronage of
politicians. The politicans heard about the brilliant victory,
but they did not hear about the officer running naked in the
jungle or of the man who believed bringing back flogging was
necessary for real dicipline.
When he returned to India in the fall of 1943, he fell ill
because he had recklessly drank contaminated water in north
africa on the way back. He had been given a blank cheque
for any resources he wanted for operations in Burma.
However, due to a combination of him being out of the country
and ill, his operational role in developing the second chindit
force wasn't very large. Eventually, an plan was thrown
together for operations in 1944. Rather than being an evolution
of his supposed theories, it mostly involved a new idea of
fighting a special operations war with a division-sized formation
operating from large bases in enemy controlled territory.
Wingate died early on during the operation so its impossible to
know what would have been the result if he had lived. However,
the only other time his 1944 strategy was used was by the
French in Vietnam where it led to total disaster.
Wingate has a number of followers. Obviously, Israelis are
greatful for the help he provided in forming what eventually
became their army. There are also those who, like wingate,
who see the british army as a failed institution and somehow
see innovation in the form of a man who cut his own throat,
ran around naked in camp, wanted to bring back flogging and
credited broader access to good health care in civilian life
as being responsible for weakening the british soldier.
A good work on Wingate has to deal with the positive aspects
and the negative ones. Too many draw a one-sided portrait
(including this one) while sweeping the not so nice parts of
the story under the rug.
NOT THE STANDARD WARRIOR GENTLEMAN
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Having been brought up on stories from my early years about the brave and often forgotten exploits of the Chindits I was very enthused to tuck into this book. Orde Wingate has been the hero of many, not so much because he was a military successful warrior, but because he was wildly unconventional at a time when staid ethics and methods of war were leading to defeats of the western allies on all fronts.
A fierce Old Testament fear and learning of the bible bread in what would now be called a fundementalist christian family, he blended this with [...] eccentricities like, indifference to appearing nude before his collegues and newspapermen, a complete indifference to British Monarchy and the hierarchical class-bound society and way of thinking. An appreciator of new ideas and probably quite to the left of many of his superiors, he had no hestation in punishing and physically striking his recruits (no matter their colour), and could kill the enemy mercilessly, or order large groups knowingly to their death without a blink.
Wingate pioneered unconventional warfare with his notion that large unit groups can function in the rear of the enemy for long periods of time if they were self-sufficient and well trained. He eschewed the entire idea of "special forces" as they are often called nowadays. In the end I do not think that he squared the circle large unit action and special forces --- he wanted both and got really neither. His tactics worked rather well against the Italians (but that was no surprise he realised), but they were problematic against the Japanese. The first operation, "Long Cloth" was an unmitigated disaster, with enough adventures from its many participants to fill an entire library (they still make some of the most heart thumping reads available). The entire operation broke down and became in some cases, every man for himself. Wingate himself giving the order.
His second operation was more problematic. No doubt these operations had significant effect on the enemy and no doubt were very helpful in the taking of Myikyena and Mogang, but I really think that 14th Army would have rolled up the Japanese flank nicely anyway, as they did and win the Battle of Burma with overwhelming firepower and troops as well unmitigated air superiority.
In the end the Japanese in Burma were beaten by traditional large unit engagements.
That is not a defeat of the ideas of Orde Wingate, nor do they negate the incredible bravery of the men who served with him. What it does DO however is to put to rest the idea that Orde Wingate was a purveyor of "Truth" -- his ideas were worthy, but they were not the be-all end-all of jungle combat. His developments were prodigeous and his personal bravery never in doubt. But I think that, like Moses, he got involved too much in fanatical devotion to one idea and was willing to sacrifice a lot for an idea. In the case of Moses, his people --- in the case of Wingate, it was often his own troops.
This books admirably chronicles the multifacted nature of Wingate. It is factual and comes across as neutral as possible, often citing critical sources and those men (also of incredible courage) that did not fall under his spell.
The narrative is tight and WELL EDITED. Unlike your regular 1000 page biography Smith and Beirman are able to deal with the subject adequately in 400 pages with nothing substantive missing. Also there is just enough detail of almost all of his life. The final 150 pages deals with the Burma campaign the authors are very skillful in their use of detail. They include all of the crucial elements necessary of his many campaigns.
I found the book to be a very admirable read. I think that it only deepened the questions I have about Wingate --- was he a daring experimenter or a madman? --- I think that one can add, bitterly-troubled person to the heap of other appelations surrounding this man.
I still ask myself, if this man were my commander would I succumb and become a convert? Would I stand aloof and protest that something is terribly wrong? I do not know, and cannot judge because I was not born at the time these events transpired. I was not a part of this great crusade, the glory they gained or the horrors they endured.